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OVERVIEW
The use of respiratory devices to protect against potentially hazardous biological aerosols 
that are transmittable via inhalation has increased in recent years. When in an environment 
containing this potential hazard, both surgical masks (SM) and N95 filtering facepiece 
respirators (FFR) have been used by the general public as well as health care workers. While 
the superior filtration and fit characteristics of N95 FFR over surgical masks have been 
demonstrated in laboratory and workplace studies with inert (non-biological) particles, their 
superiority in reducing disease transmission in clinical/field settings is still questioned by 
some members of the health care/infection control industry. Attempts to study the relative 
efficacy of the two devices in the field using clinical outcomes have yielded inconclusive 
results because of limitations in experimental design and implementation.
This commentary examines the differences between the two devices and identifies 
considerations necessary to study their performance properly. No study to date has been 
conducted in a manner that would allow the performance of the two types of devices to be 
differentiated. In particular, study subjects failing to wear the assigned device during all 
times of potential exposure, along with a lack of continuous observation of subjects’ use, 
compromise the superior protection the N95 FFR can provide. Additionally, the lack of 
formalized, complete respiratory protection programs negates the superior filtration and fit 
characteristics of the N95 FFR. As has been shown in industrial workplaces, one may 
reasonably expect that N95 FFR will effectively reduce health care workers’ inhalation 
exposures to airborne biological agents when complete, effective respiratory programs are in 
place. Because voluntary users and the general public will not likely use respirators under 
the guidance of a formal program, the benefit of respirator use alone is likely to be minimal.
INTRODUCTION
Respiratory protection devices are an important element of an overall contagion control 
strategy when infectious biological aerosols are potentially present in an occupational 
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environment. In health care facilities, N95 class FFR certified by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) are typically the minimum class of respiratory 
protection recommended.(1,2) In contrast, studies exist that suggest that surgical masks 
normally used in health care settings may be equally effective in reducing disease 
transmission.(3,4) The “respirator versus surgical mask” debate continues in both health care 
and non-health care settings.
This article describes and evaluates the findings of recent studies examining the role of 
respirators and surgical masks in reducing disease transmission. Established principles of 
evaluating respiratory protective device performance are used to explain inconclusive 
results. This article also makes recommendations to maximize respiratory protection from 
biological aerosols.
RESPIRATORS AND SURGICAL MASKS
While similar in appearance, N95 FFR and SM are designed to serve different purposes. 
Stated briefly, surgical masks (SM) are intended to prevent bacteria and other particles 
exhaled by the wearer from contaminating a sterile field (e.g., patient’s wound). This device 
also serves as a barrier to prevent the wearer from touching his/her oronasal region with 
contaminated hands or gloves as well as to protect that region from direct sprays and 
splashes. SM are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Particle filtration 
performance evaluation is recommended, but no minimum level of filtration efficiency is 
required.(5) SM are not mandated to form a seal against the user’s face; any leakage provides 
a route for biological particles to enter the wearer’s breathing zone.
FFRs also serve as a barrier to touching of the oronasal region, and some of them also act as 
a barrier to direct sprays and splashes. However, FFRs’ primary function is to reduce the 
wearer’s exposure to particles with aerodynamic diameters in the inhalable (≤100 μm) size 
fraction, including those in the respirable size range (≤10 μm).(6) Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that biological and non-biological particles are filtered in the same manner, 
with equivalent efficiency.(7–13) Filtration efficiency criteria for N95 FFR are set by NIOSH 
and are measured under rigorous test conditions.(14) Any certified particulate respirator must 
be at least 95% efficient when tested according to NIOSH criteria. In addition, FFR must be 
capable of forming a seal to the user’s face in order to be worn in an occupational setting. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has specific test criteria for 
demonstrating acceptable respirator fit on each individual user.(15) OSHA also regulates 
FFR selection, use, and care in workplaces, including health care facilities.(15,16)
The filtration and fit characteristics of SM were evaluated by Oberg and Brosseau.(17) Nine 
surgical masks, six of which met all FDA performance criteria, were subjected to the 
NIOSH filtration efficiency test and OSHA-mandated fit tests. The filters ranged from 
approximately 10% to 96% efficiency under the NIOSH test conditions; only one SM met 
the NIOSH minimum requirement for filter efficiency. This finding was consistent with 
research done by NIOSH, which also found a wide range of filtration performance for SM 
tested at the NIOSH filtration test conditions.(18) Furthermore, quantitative fit tests 
conducted by Oberg and Brosseau resulted in only two acceptable fits out of 40 trials. 
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Consequently, small particles are likely to enter the wearer’s breathing zone via both the SM 
itself (poor filtration) and the gaps between the SM and the skin of the face (poor fit). As 
such, SM cannot be expected to significantly reduce the inhalation of infectious aerosols.
ASSESSMENT OF FFR AND SM EFFECTS ON DISEASE TRANSMISSION
Recent studies have attempted to measure the ability of FFR, SM, or both in a variety of 
occupational and community settings.(3,4,19–25) To understand the results of these studies, it 
is important to identify several factors that confound the assessment of how well either type 
of device performs.
Multiple Routes of Exposure
Aerosol transmission of biological particles is only one of several routes of exposure for 
some diseases for which respiratory protection may be used. Recent field studies(26,27) 
suggested that long-range transmission of influenza is possible via aerosols in the respirable 
size range. Additionally, investigations of disease outbreaks(28,29) suggest proximity to the 
index (first) case as a major factor in respiratory disease transmission. This may indicate 
increased inhalation exposure to small particles, and/or transmission of a virus (e.g., 
influenza) by particles >100 μm (droplets, sprays) produced when an infected person coughs 
or sneezes. It is traditionally believed that droplet spray transmission occurs only within a 
radius of approximately ~3 feet from the infected person, although recent recommendations 
have suggested that 6 to 10 feet may be prudent for emerging or highly virulent 
pathogens.(2) Transmission of some viruses may occur by touching contaminated surfaces or 
objects with the hands and subsequently touching the eyes, nose, or mouth. Exposure of 
unprotected eyes to airborne viruses may also contribute to infection.(19) Importantly, the 
relative contribution of each mode of transmission is not clear for many diseases.(30,31)
By limiting droplet spray and hand contact with the nose and mouth, both FFR and SM may 
limit disease transmission by these routes. Because only FFR are designed and tested to 
filter small aerosols and effectively seal to the user’s face (demonstrated by individual fit 
testing), they are expected to be more effective than SM in controlling transmission of 
disease via particle inhalation. It is also critical that gloves, gowns, and eye protection be 
used in conjunction with hand washing to control the non-inhalation exposure routes if the 
efficacy of either FFR or SM is to be assessed. This “bundling” of interventions can, in 
itself, confound the evaluation of FFR or SM performance.
Lack of Airborne Exposure Limits
Human dose-response curves for some respiratory pathogens, including influenza, have been 
developed (32) and used to estimate the infectious dose of influenza A in humans.(33) In 
these studies, both the likelihood of infection and the severity of symptoms increased with 
an increasing inhalation dose of influenza virus. These findings are consistent with the 
pattern seen with other hazardous aerosols, and the same industrial hygiene principles of 
control apply to both inert (i.e., non-biological) and biological aerosols.
Nonetheless, while quantitative airborne exposure limits do exist for the inert particulate 
hazards (dusts, fumes, and so on) for which FFR are commonly worn, these limits have not 
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been established for biological hazards. Accordingly, no field study of FFR or SM 
performance against pathogens such as influenza has attempted to measure airborne 
biological particles either outside (Co) or inside (Ci) the device during periods of exposure. 
This means there is no assurance that the device under evaluation was tested with a 
sufficient concentration of airborne infectious agents, or how much the device was able to 
reduce the inhaled exposure. In contrast, workplace studies of FFR performance against 
inert hazards use Co and Ci measurements to define the device’s efficacy: the calculated 
Co:Ci ratio represents performance, i.e., how much the FFR reduces exposure and is called 
the workplace protection factor (WPF).(34–39) For contaminants with exposure limits, FFR 
performance is adequate when Ci measurements are below that limit. While Co:Ci ratios for 
biological contaminants may not be convenient (or even feasible) to measure at this time, 
they would provide reasonable estimates of the actual exposure reduction provided by the 
devices in use.
Multiple Exposure Venues
Infectious agents can be present in health care facilities and other workplaces, in the homes 
of infected individuals, and in general community environments such as schools, theaters, 
and mass transit vehicles. Because the end point of FFR or SM performance studies is 
typically infection (or a marker of infection), it is critical that participants are not potentially 
exposed to the infectious agent in any venue outside that in which the device is being tested. 
Clearly, infections that are acquired outside the environment in which the FFR or SM is 
used cannot be attributed to poor performance of the device.
Non-Compliance and Lack of Subject Observation
Respiratory protection for airborne biological or chemical hazards can be effective only 
when properly worn during all times of exposure. Overall protection is rapidly reduced 
when the FFR is not worn during even short periods of exposure. The term Effective 
Protection Factor (EPF) describes the amount by which the challenge atmosphere is reduced 
by FFR, taking into account periods of non-wear time in the contaminated atmosphere.(39) It 
is calculated as follows:
Ts = Shift or exposure duration
Tw = Time the respirator is worn
Tnw = Time the respirator is not worn
WPF = Workplace protection factor
Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic decrease in protection with increasing periods of non-wear 
time. The EPF of 10 is equivalent to the minimum level of protection normally expected 
when a properly fitted and used FFR is worn, i.e., a 10-fold reduction in exposure. As 
shown, even FFR with the potential to reduce exposures 100- to 500-fold are unable to 
provide the expected level of protection when non-wear time exceeds 10%. As non-wear 
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time increases to approximately 50%, the EPF for the three respirators shown is 2, or little 
better than no protection at all.
Respiratory Protection Program Status
OSHA regulation 29 CFR 1910.134 requires employers to develop and implement a written 
program to maximize the effectiveness of all respiratory protective devices.(15) The program 
must include work site-specific procedures governing all aspects of respirator use, and be 
overseen by a suitably trained program administrator. The program must include the 
following provisions, as applicable to the devices in use: (1) selection procedures; (2) 
medical evaluations of employees required to use respirators; (3) fit testing procedures for 
tight-fitting respirators; (4) procedures for proper use of respirators in routine and 
reasonably foreseeable emergency situations; (5) procedures and schedules for cleaning, 
disinfecting, storing, inspecting, repairing, discarding, and otherwise maintaining 
respirators; (6) procedures to ensure adequate breathing air quality, quantity, and flow (for 
atmosphere-supplying respirators); (7) employee training on the respiratory hazards to 
which they are potentially exposed during routine and emergency situations; (8) training of 
employees in the proper use of respirators, including putting on and removing them, and any 
limitations on their use and their maintenance; and (9) procedures for regularly evaluating 
the effectiveness of the program.
FFR and other certified half-facepiece respirators can reliably reduce particle exposures at 
least 10-fold when used in the context of a proper respiratory protection program.(34–37) This 
pattern holds true for non-infectious bioaerosols. Cho et al.(38) determined that geometric 
mean exposures to endotoxins, fungal spores, and (1→3)-β-D-glucan were all reduced by a 
factor of 18 or more using half-facepiece respirators. Conversely, when one or more 
program elements are missing, protection can be significantly compromised.(40)
PERFORMANCE STUDIES
Controlled laboratory studies with human test subjects wearing different types of protective 
devices have measured higher Co:Ci ratios for FFR compared to SM.(41–43) These studies 
used an inert particle challenge. Similar data are necessary to demonstrate that FFR are 
providing protection from inhaled infectious aerosols superior to that provided by SM.
However, none of the clinical and field studies attempting to estimate the effects of SM and 
FFR on disease transmission have measured Co:Ci ratios and have, instead, used widely 
disparate methods.(3,4,12,13, 20–25) Most are epidemiological studies that use FFR or SM as 
an intervention, alone, or in combination with other interventions. Performance of the 
respiratory device is evaluated based on changes in clinical outcomes (e.g., infection rate of 
the group using the device). No study to date has adequately taken into account the five 
confounding factors listed above. Until this is done, definitive conclusions about the ability 
of either FFR or SM to reduce disease transmission cannot be drawn.
The reliance on subjects’ self-reporting and/or inconsistent monitoring of the compliance of 
subjects’ use of the device under evaluation are the deficiencies common to nearly every 
study to date addressing the effects of FFR or SM use on disease transmission. Estimated 
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compliance rates in the range of 50–75% are commonly reported.(21,23) However, it is 
important to note that self-reported compliance is not a reliable indicator of actual 
compliance. For example, one study on hand hygiene compliance among health care 
workers (HCW) reported low correlation between self-reported adherence and observed 
adherence, with statistically higher levels of self-reported compliance compared to observed 
compliance.(44) For FFR/SM, no study was found to report 100% wear time during all 
exposure periods, verified by continuous, direct observation of test subjects. As shown in 
Figure 1, non-wear during exposure rapidly reduces the superior respiratory protection 
expected of FFR as compared to SM.
Studies in which compliance is optional are evaluating the impact of subject behavior rather 
than the capability of the FFR or SM to reduce inhalation of infectious aerosols. Several 
recent studies illustrate this and other deficiencies that make it impossible to judge the 
performance of a properly used respiratory device:
• Loeb et al.(3) found no statistically significant difference in influenza infection rates 
of HCW wearing either a fit tested N95 FFR or an SM. Subject compliance (wear) 
rates were not known, as only periodic audits of device usage were done. In 
addition, use of gloves, gowns, and hand washing were not monitored, and the 
possibility of community exposure to influenza was acknowledged.
• Another study of the efficacy of SM and N95 FFR (both fit tested and not fit tested) 
in HCW found respiratory illness/influenza infection rates in workers in either FFR 
group were roughly half the rate of those wearing SM.(22) Interestingly, both 
groups of FFR performed equivalently, i.e., fit testing showed no beneficial effect. 
While laboratory studies show that FFR are expected to provide more protection 
from inhaled aerosols than SM, it is not certain that they were actually responsible 
for the lower infection rates in the two groups who wore them. First, the authors 
defined compliance as wearing the device as ≥80% of the work shift, and 68–76% 
of subjects were said to comply (Figure 1). Compliance was determined by head 
nurses’ observations and subjects’ self-reporting. Additionally, the devices were 
evaluated in different groups of hospitals, and no air samples were taken to ensure 
exposures were equivalent for all the groups. Again, it is plausible that exposures 
and behaviors (including non-compliance) at individual sites were dissimilar and 
could account for the differences in infection rates.
• Studies of health care facilities that used both N95 FFR and SM for workers 
potentially exposed to H1N1 influenza or severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) have been reported by Seto et al.(4) and Ang et al.,(45) respectively. The 
Seto study also included unspecified “paper masks.” The two investigations 
suggested that both FFR and SM controlled infection, but the “paper masks” in the 
Seto et al. study did not. However, both studies were retrospective and relied on 
participants’ self-reporting on the use of the devices, other PPE, and hand washing. 
As such, no valid conclusions regarding the performance of a properly used FFR or 
SM can be drawn.
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• Community studies using SM and N95 FFR (or a European P2 FFR) on influenza 
patients and/or household members have also been conducted.(20,21,23,24) In some 
cases, hand washing was used as an additional intervention. Because these studies 
typically describe subject-reported compliance rates of ~50%, they are of 
essentially no value for assessing respiratory device performance.
Several literature reviews (46–48) identify these and additional deficiencies of studies 
conducted to date. These authors described most studies as underpowered, too small, and/or 
poorly designed. In concert with the discussion above, bin-Reza et al.(48) call for objective 
exposure data and objective monitoring of compliance and examination of other confounders 
to determine if FFR or SM have any beneficial effect on disease transmission. In spite of 
limited data on the benefit of any specific intervention, bin-Reza et al. suggest “masks” 
would best be used in combination with other interventions, especially hand washing in both 
health care and home settings. Few studies or literature reviews acknowledge the need for a 
comprehensive respiratory protection program to manage the use of FFR or SM.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The “respirators versus surgical mask” debate is complex and remains hotly debated.(31) 
Advocates of SM note the accessibility and lower costs of these devices and the lack of a 
need for fit testing.(49) Thus, some have argued for the need for comparative effectiveness in 
clinical trials to better address performance. Although many laboratory studies in controlled 
environments using manikins and human subjects exist, there have been no properly 
designed field studies to assess the ability of FFR and SM to reduce disease transmission 
rates. The difficulty of conducting such studies is compounded by lack of exposure limits, 
knowledge of an inhaled infectious dose, multiple exposure venues, and the interactions of 
several interventions used simultaneously. Current studies(50) may properly address these 
difficulties, but it is unlikely a true FFR or SM clinical efficacy study will be completed in 
the near future. Thus, their role in reducing disease transmission must be based on inference 
and laboratory studies for the time being.
Because biological particles have repeatedly been shown to be filtered in the same manner 
as other particles,(7–13,37,38) the same level of FFR performance can be expected when they 
are used against biological aerosols: that is, if properly fitted and worn during all periods of 
exposure to an infectious aerosol of concern, inhalation of that aerosol will be reduced 10-
fold. Because there are no requirements for small particle filtration efficiency or fit for SM, 
they should not be expected to provide respiratory protection.
A similar finding was provided in a 2009 report by an Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
committee tasked with providing recommendations on respiratory protection for HCW in the 
workplace during the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic.(51) That committee concluded that 
HCW in close contact with individuals with novel H1N1 influenza or influenza-like 
illnesses should use fit tested N95 FFR in accordance with OSHA respiratory protection 
standards and not SM. Similar to this article, the IOM committee based its findings on the 
evidence of possible airborne transmission of novel H1N1 influenza and the superior 
filtering and fit characteristics of FFR compared to SM.
Janssen et al. Page 7













As discussed previously, noncompliance with FFR use is a major detriment to effective 
respiratory protection. A recent study by Nichol et al.(52) concluded that adherence to the 
use of FFR in a health care setting could be improved with the ready availability of 
equipment, training and fit testing, organizational support for worker health and safety, and 
good communication practices. These recommendations are consistent with the elements of 
an effective respiratory protection program described by 1910.134. It is likely that facilities 
that implement these practices will achieve FFR performance equivalent to that shown in 
industrial studies. If particle inhalation is a significant route of exposure for that aerosol, 
FFR are far more likely to reduce infection via this route than are SM.
Furthermore, no evidence suggests that significant respiratory protection from biological 
aerosols can be achieved in any exposure venue without addressing respirator program 
elements. Unlike health care workplaces, members of the general public or casual 
(voluntary) workplace users will not have identified where and when exposures to infectious 
aerosols might occur; it is therefore likely that FFR would not be in use when an exposure 
does occur. Secondly, the benefits of individual fit testing have been well 
documented,(34–38, 53,54) and general public FFR users generally do not make the effort to be 
fit tested properly. Thus, these users may or may not achieve meaningful inhalation 
exposure reduction, even if the FFR is properly donned during an exposure episode. These 
limitations hold for all FFR, including those cleared by the FDA as N95/surgical masks or 
for general public use.(55)
As is the case with any respiratory hazard, the industrial hygiene hierarchy of controls 
should be applied to control infectious aerosols; the hazard should be reduced through 
engineering and administrative methods to the extent possible. Infection control practices 
and the use of other personal protective equipment as described Siegel et al.(56) should also 
be implemented.
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